

Nigeria's 'Quadrilemma': Globalization, State Delegitimization, Religious Fundamentalism and Insecurity

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Abstract

This paper examines the forces that have animated insecurity in Africa/Nigeria via the instrumentality of religious fundamentalism. Drawing data mainly from secondary sources, and leaning on social contract theoretical framework, it argues that contrary to the conventional wisdom that Boko-Harm-styled insecurity in Nigeria is fuelled by religious fundamentalism, the real force lies in neo-imperialism masquerading as globalization. To be sure, this global phenomenon though the mechanism of market reforms has further delegitimized and deconstructed the state in Africa. Put differently, it has alienated the state not only from itself but has also succeeded in alienating it from the citizens. With the alienation of the Leviathan from the society, sub-state actors step in to fill the vacuum. This is where ethnic and religious militias come into the picture. The paper submits that remediation lies in the decolonization and the restructuring of the state via the instrumentality of process-led constitution-making.

Keywords: *Quadrilemma, globalization, the state, security, decolonization, legitimacy.*

Introduction: A Sketch of the Context

At a point in time, every nation is confronted with a myriad of challenges that may make or mar her. Nigeria is not an exception to this seeming reality as she is today confronted by variegated challenges. Among these are the 'quadrilemma' or four-pronged challenges of globalization, state delegitimization, religious fundamentalism and insecurity. In a rapidly changing world, nation-states appear to be at the receiving end of an enigma called globalization (Adejumobi, 2004; Rosenau, 2006; Olayode, 2006). As Ohmae (1995) aptly puts it, "states had become 'dinosaurs waiting to die'". Indeed, the concept of security state that has traditionally and ideologically underpinned the Westphalia state system appears to have been called to question by the rampaging force of globalization (Castells, 1993; Mc Michael, 2000).

In the global south, the state that ought to be the driver of development has been denationalized and incapacitated to the extent that it has become completely alien to the “citizens” under its watch. Put differently, the virtual force of globalization has not only alienated the state from itself but has also alienated the state from its citizens. As people lose faith in the state, they find solace in ethno-religious ideologies and movements. Sadly, these entities often assume extreme cum fundamentalist postures threatening the society and the state itself. In Nigeria, it is widely believed especially in the media circles that Boko-Haram’s fundamentalism is the root cause of the insecurity in the northern part of the country. It is here contended that while this thinking may be plausible, it does not capture the whole scenario.

It is against this background that this paper seeks to capture the whole gamut of forces that have animated insecurity in contemporary Nigeria. To achieve this grand objective, the paper has been deliberately partitioned into five sections. The first section, the introduction set the background and the major thesis of the paper, which for convenience sake is recast here: beyond the facade of insecurity wrought on the Nigerian nation by the fundamentalism of Boko-Haram, lays the hidden driver, globalization-induced state delegitimization. The section that follows attempts to clear the conceptual undergrowth by defining the core concepts used in the paper. Section three sets the analytical framework for the paper. Specifically, it lays bare theoretical link between the state and the citizens. The fourth section attempts to decipher the real drivers of fundamentalism and insecurity in contemporary Nigeria. Section five concludes the paper with a number of policy prescriptions.

Definition of Key Concepts

In this section, attempts are made to define some concepts, which are integral to this discourse in order to enhance our understanding of them in the contexts in which they are used and their connectivity. The concepts are: globalization, state delegitimization, religious fundamentalism and insecurity.

Globalization

Frankly speaking, since the end of the bi-polar world experiment in 1991, the concept of globalization has emerged the most popular and also the most controversial in the field of international political economy (Copper, 2000; Obadan, 2004; Basiru, 2009; Afegbua and Adejumo, 2009). Indeed, it has come to mean many things to many people (Tidwell and Lerche, 2004: 48) As Patman (2006: 10) puts in “*despite vast literature on the subject, it is difficult to give a precise definition of globalization*” In a similar vein, Obadan (2004:2) contends thus:

The concepts of globalization is perhaps today the most recurrent term employed by scholars and world leaders alike, to rationalize, the development and underdevelopment of the various

part of the world. As a result of this, it has assumed the status of an essentially contested concept.

From this premise, it can be asserted that the concept of globalization, like other key concepts in the social sciences *ala* power, class, democracy etc., is an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1962). As a result, scholars have defined it in various ways depending on their intellectual predilection and or ideological orientations. In fact, a respected comparativist, Professor Fred Riggs (2003) once echoed the multidisciplinary dimensions of the concept of globalization when he submits that, it has been the concerns of no less than seven academic disciplines.

However, it is instructive to note that in most definitions of the subject, the politico-economic dimensions are often emphasized. For example, Akparu-Aja and Emeribe (2000), from international political economy perspective, see globalization as the greater openness of national and international economies to greater flow of trade, finance, capital, high technology, foreign direct investment (FDI) and market integration offerings. To Ikeme (2008), globalization means trade liberalization, free capital mobility, privatization, commercialization and the empowerment of transnational corporations.

From a global shrinkage perspective, it is conceived as the shrinkage of time and space. Larsson (2001), states, "it is the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer. It pertains to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world." To Waters (1995), "it is a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding". In a more elaborate manner, Held et al (in Tidwell, & Lerche, 2004) define this scenario in terms of four key factors, namely:

- *Extensity* is the stretching of social, political, and economic activities across frontiers and borders. An event in one region has impacts elsewhere, so for example changes in share prices in New York may lead to women in Malaysia losing their job in a shoe manufacturing plant.
- *Intensity* is more than occasional interconnectedness, as it refers to a growing number of interconnections. The number of relationships between events, institutions and people in San Francisco and Santiago, Chile are increasing.
- *Velocity* is the speed of interactions. Thus, not only is the rate at which the interconnectedness between Santiago and San Francisco increasing, but the time taken to establish connections is constantly shrinking.
- *Impact* is the deepening of extensity, intensity and velocity. Distant events have greater local consequences.

Joining issues with Held et al., is Ohiorhenuan (1998) who conceive it as the broadening and deepening linkages of national economies into a worldwide market for goods and services, especially capital. Expanding this argument, Gordimer (1992) sees it as the expansion of

trade over the oceans and airspaces beyond traditional alliances which were restricted by old political sphere of influence.

From the foregoing, it clear that globalization is a capitalist phenomenon that breaks national barriers. It manifests in market reform/policy in developing countries. In this context, we follow Madunagu (1999) by defining globalization as rapid expansion through giant multinational companies of capitalism and their blood sapping principles of liberalization, commercialization, privatization and property-based democratization to several areas of the world including where it has hitherto been restricted or put in check.

State Delegitimization

By the virtue of its hegemonic position in relations to other groups in the society, the state works as an umbrella entity that caters for the needs of all. By so doing, it enjoys the unalloyed allegiance of the people (Ninalowo, 2010). Put differently, the people invest it legitimacy, the right to command their obedience having fulfilled its own side of the social contract (Andrew, 2000). Conversely, if it fails in its historic mission of improving the human conditions even if it enjoys procedural support, it loses the support of the people and resultantly, state delegitimization sets in (Ninalowo, 1999).

Under this condition, people would openly express their dissatisfaction against the state and its functionaries. They would not only challenge the state but would also be willing to realize their objectives even outside the context of the present state (Lipson, 1976). From the foregoing, state delegitimization is conceived as the citizens' withdrawal from the state as a result of its failure to discharge its welfare responsibilities.

On Religious Fundamentalism

This is an emotive term that has been object of intense controversies especially in the media space. To the liberals, religion must be rationally moderated. In other words, any religious practice that goes to the irrational extreme constitutes religious extremism or simply fundamentalism (Ali, 2002; Ruthven, 2004). However, for the purpose of this paper, it is conceived in ideological terms. Put differently, it is not conceived in sectarian context. For example, in political economy literature, scholars talk of market fundamentalism to depict extreme faith in neoliberal globalization (Adejumobi, 2005).

Seen this way, religious fundamentalism is the ideology that drives a group of people to believe that its own religion or sect is pure and sacred while others are contaminated. Thus, like a Sino centrist who sees the Chinese culture as the centre of the universe, a religious fundamentalist also see his religion as the core. In India for example, Hindu fundamentalism has been informed by the belief that other faiths are not sacred (Haynes, 1993). Similarly,

in most parts of the Middle-East, the sectarian violence between the Sunnis and Shiites is believed to have been rooted in the fundamentalism of each against the other. From the foregoing, religious fundamentalism is conceived as a strong ideological belief in a religion being superior and sacred and while all others inferior, unsacred.

Security/Insecurity

The term 'insecurity' like other contrasting concepts in the social sciences-development/underdevelopment- can only be comprehended after grasping the meaning of security. Put differently, understanding the term 'insecurity' entails defining security. To start with, the concept of security is a multifaceted one. It covers every sphere of human endeavours (Akinyeye, 2001). This explains why analysts talk about various types of security. Instructively, in the context of international relations, security is associated with the activities of nation-states (Shinoda, 2004). Although, security, in contemporary world, goes beyond the security of states (Buzan, 1983; Ayoob, 1987), the fact remains, other faces of security are tied to that of the state.

Given the foregoing, how do we conceptualize security? Here we find Imobighe's definition illuminating. According to him:

Security has to do with freedom from danger, or with threat to a nation's ability to protect and develop itself, promote its cherished values and legitimate interests, and enhance the well-being of people (1990:224)

From this perspective, security denotes freedom from fear or danger. Put differently, the state of being free from internal and external threat to life and properties. Conceived this way, insecurity is the absence of such condition. In contemporary Nigeria internal insecurity implies "unfreedom" from danger to life and properties.

Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Social Contact Theory (SCT) is adopted as the theoretical umbrella for this paper. The theory contends that the relationship between the state and the citizens is a sort of social exchange where the latter offers unalloyed allegiance to the former for supplying social goods most especially security (Oomen, 1997). The development of the theory is linked to the contractarians of the early modern Europe *ala*Bodin, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. Without a central authority to enforce order, claimed Hobbes for example, society regresses to civil war. To avert this uncivil condition, a social contract was entered into by rational individuals seeking protection from each other's mischief. By granting a monopoly of the sword to a Leviathan, the state or king, the society is transformed from anarchy into order, securing not only peace but also the opportunity for human endeavours to flourish (Hague and Harrop, 2007).

It is instructive to note that Hobbes probably neglected the real issue, consent, in his theory. In Locke's theory, state's power is limited not only by contract but by consent. Put differently, when the state or its agents fails to fulfill its own side of the contract, like safeguarding life, property and liberty, it loses legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, then resistance ensues (Nwabueze, 2003). According to Rosenau (2006), social contract theory consists of the recurrent orientations, practices and patterns through which citizens at the micro level are linked to their state at the macro level.

Put differently, it is the authority structures where the political state achieves and sustains the cooperation and compliance of their memberships. Instructively, it is underwritten by institutionalized authority structure. In the modern globalized era, it specifically defined in performance terms. In other words, the readiness of individuals within the state to comply with governing directives is much a function of their assessment of the performances of the state. Thus, the more the performance record is considered appropriate- in terms of satisfying needs, moving toward goals- the more are they are likely to cooperate and comply. The less they approve the performance record, the more are they likely to withhold their compliance or otherwise complicate the efforts of the states.

In all, the theory contends that a state-citizenship relation is oriented towards mutual exchange. As long as each party keeps to its contractual terms, harmony ensues, and if otherwise, a crisis beckons. Situated in the context of this paper, the theory is relevant to comprehending state-citizens relations in Nigeria in the era of globalization.

Pathways to State delegitimization, Religion Fundamentalism and Insecurity in Nigeria

Instructively, while countries with strong developmental orientations *ala* China, India, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia have embraced neo-modernization/globalization on their own terms, Nigeria appeared not to have followed the paths of these countries. As a result, she has been at the mercy of the agents of globalization (Basiru, 2011). At this juncture, a question is apt: how did she get into this sorry state? Before, we answer this question, it is imperative to historicize the country's political economy. To begin with, the Nigerian post-colonial state, like its precursor, is a peripheral capitalist formation designed to be subservient to global imperialist interests (Ake, 1978; Ekekwe, 1986).

Specifically, during the first phase of globalization, an era before the First World War, the colonial economy in Nigeria was systematically integrated into the capitalist world economy as an enclave economy (Ake, 1981; Onimode, 2000). In real terms, the colonial state put in place by the imperialists to facilitate exploitation and plunder, was not only anti- development but also anti-natives. To be sure, its *raison de 'tre* was using the awesome power at its disposal to facilitate imperialist exploitation of the country's resources (Yandaki, 2012). The point being made here is that the colonial state never considered the natives' welfare its priority. As Thomson (2000:13) lucidly remarks '*colonial officials that acted on*

behalf of the created state were not accountable to the Africans they ruled. Instead, they obey orders emanating from their superior in Europe'

Thus, *ab initio*, the colonial state lacks legitimacy and thus had to rely on raw power to achieve the goals of extracting surplus from the society. Consequently, the natives suffered massive deprivation. In the words of Williams (1980:11) '*Nigeria suffered not only from the development of capitalism but from the backwardness of that development*'. In all, the colonial state created a pervasive feeling of different nationalities in the natives through the mechanism of divide and rule. This encouraged ethnicity and further alienation from the state (Nnoli, 1980; 1995). With time, the political structure that underwrote colonial enterprise in the country began to be questioned by the emerging bourgeoisie during the decolonization phase.

Fortunately, they succeeded in wresting political power from colonial officials on October 1, 1960 and thus launching the country into the neo-colonial phase of globalization. To be sure, the political economy continued to be influenced by external forces. According to Ake (1996:13), in spite of independence, the autocratic, arbitrariness and undemocratic of the colonial state structure transmuted wholesale into its post-colonial heir and still defines its nature as an illegitimate and undemocratic entity that is delinked from the society. Therefore, what the natives witnessed after independence, according to (Odukoya, 2006: 247) were changes without change. Ake once again put the scenario thus:

For the most part, at independence the colonial state was inherited by the indigenous elite rather than being liquidated or transformed. As was the case with the colonial state, the distinguishing characteristic of the post-colonial state in Africa is its lack of autonomy; power was highly fused and used by those in control of the state simply as the instrument for serving their own interests (2000:115-16).

As was expected, the neo-colonial state generated its own antimonies. The most fundamental was the premium placed on political power. Why? While colonialism lasted, the indigenous elites, now the successor elites were marginalized in the exploitation sector. By the time of independence, they were weak materially. The independence and the power that came with it now afforded them the opportunity to recoup what they have lost under colonialism. To this end, capturing political power was considered the license to wealth accumulation and it has largely remained so to date.

Under this condition, politics became a matter of life and death as the political system was polarized into two antagonistic camps: the power incumbent and the power contenders. The former deployed all forms of tactics and strategies, including electoral manipulations, to hold on tenaciously to power. The latter was also not short of dethroning strategies (Mackintosh, 1966; Dudley, 1982). Resultantly, the Nigerian state became an arena of intra-elites struggle for power as the nascent 'democrats' battled one another to control its soul. In the process, national development and by extension citizens' welfare were sacrificed on the

altar of politics. Indeed, the struggle was so intense that the military has to come in to save the nation from disintegration (Dudley, 1973; Kirk-Green, 1970). Ake (2000:6), generally in the context of Africa, puts it:

Political competition now assumed the character of warfare and paved the way for the ascendancy of the specialists of violence, the military. The rash of military coups that came later essentially formalized a reality that was already firmly established. It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics rather it was the character of politics that engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare inevitably propelling the specialists of warfare to lead the role.

With the appearance of the ‘armed specialists’ on the African political turf, the colonial legacy of authoritarianism and statism were further entrenched in the country. This mode of governance, except from 1979 to 1983, lasted until the rebirth of democracy in 1999. Sadly, the military institution, given the character of the Nigerian state, soon got embroiled in intra-class struggle, manifesting in coups and counter-coups (Panter-Brick, 1981). Thus like their civilian compatriots, they were also enmeshed in governance contradictions. The point being made here is that the post-colonial ruling elites (military/civilian) did not consider citizens’ welfare, a topmost priority. Interestingly, they could not claim to be anti-development as this would have considerably undermined their esteemed hegemony. In this wise, they had to invent an ideology of dependent development in order to deradicalize the bruised citizens. Quoting extensively, Ake (1996:19) remarks that:

In the final analysis, dependent development was a politically driven decision hinging on considerations of political survival, considerations that impelled African leaders to marginalize development and even their role in its pursuit. It is indicative of their limited commitment to development that with few exceptions, African countries came to independence with hardly any discernible vision of development and no agenda for its realization.

Therefore, in order to deradicalize the bruised citizens, the post-independence ruling elites in Nigeria have not been bereaved of development strategies. Umezurike (2012:25) have broadly classify them into broadly into two, namely, those that inadvertently aimed at promoting economic nationalism of the Nigerian state and those that were directly structured and oriented towards advancing market liberalization and state divestiture. Included in the first category are: indigenization and Nigerianisation; land use reform; and reforms for poverty alleviation. In the second category are: austerity measures, economic stabilization programme, privatization and commercialisation which were all embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and also in the current practices, the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). For the sake of elucidation, we are sketch out the country’s development trajectory below.

In the first phase of the development agenda (1960-66), the nascent comprador elite, conscious of the country's dependent status coupled with the global ideological horse trading, wove the nation's development policy in conformity with the reality of the era (Anglin, 1964). In fact, Nigerian first Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa put the then scenario this way:

At present, we lack the necessary capital and technical skill to develop our own resources by ourselves alone.... How are we to obtain help from outside and still keep free from being under the influence of one power bloc or another conscious of the dependent nature of the nation's economy and the global ideological horse trading, weighed carefully the options available to the country (Balewa, 1964)

Given the prevailing reality then, he believed that, the best strategy for the furtherance of Nigeria's economic growth at the time was import-substitution-industrialization (ISI). In real terms, it was a policy directed primarily at attracting foreign investment, external public loans and grants without putting in jeopardy the country's internal security and political independence.

Progressively, in the second phase (1966-80), the governing regimes adopted the strategy of state intervention in the economy. The principal objectives of the state at this stage appeared to be two folds, namely to provide basic infrastructure to accelerate growth, and moderate economic transactions in order to ensure social equity in the distribution of the fruits of development (Asobie, 1991; Ologbenla, 1993; Onuoha, 2009).

During this period, the country's economy like those of its peers in Africa experienced marginal gain (Olukoshi, 1990; Chisanga, 2010). However, by 1981, the second phase of post-colonial dependent development has run out its full course as the country and its leadership, having failed to better the lots of the citizens, mortgaged the right to direct the economy to the Bretton Woods financial institutions. The country was thus launched into the adjustment phase of neo-colonial globalization (Oluyemi-Kusa, 1994, Adejumobi, 1994; Umezurike, 2012). Since then, except during the era of guided deregulation of General Sani Abacha, and now, the Nigerian State and its political leadership has succumbed to structural adjustment globalization.

In its first phase, the adjustment phase, the state redirect spending away from public-owned enterprises into debt servicing. By adopting policies of currency devaluation, trade liberalization, subsidy removal and privatization of private enterprises, the regime of General Babangida embraced the logic of a minimal state (Ihonvbere, 1993; Olukoshi and Nwoke, 1994). Sadly, the policy soon generated its own contradictions and ultimately failed in delivering welfare to the people. For instance, the real per capital consumption deteriorated from 1,250 naira in 1987 to 1,150 naira in 1995 (Obianyo, 2009). Similarly, the poverty level of the population increased astronomically (Mkandawre, and Olukoshi, 1995;

Onimode, 2000; Olukoshi, 2003). In fact, the data in the NEEDS document indicate that the poverty level of the population increased from 27% in 1980 to about 70% in 1996 and by 1999 to over 70% (NPC, 2004).

Instructively, despite these obvious facts about the failure of SAP, the BWIs held on to the belief that the reform could not fail and if it did, it must have been as result of bad governance, neopatrimonialism and corruption. The solution, to this according to them, thus lies in the enthronement of good governance and accountability. By accepting this thesis, the regime of General Abubakar launched the country into the post-adjustment phase. However, the regime, being a transitory one, though accepted the new agenda, believed that it would be better implemented in a democracy.

Fortunately, democracy did berth on the 29th May, 1999. At this historic moment, it was expected that popular power would translate into sustainable growth and development (Obasanjo, 1999). On assuming office, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, armed with the philosophy of good governance, embarked on a massive reform programmes. Through two economic grand strategies, the Economic Directions (1999) and the National Economic Empowerment and Development strategy (2003), the regime believed that it would launch the country on the path of sustainable growth and stability. While the regime lasted, globalization-oriented market reforms were pursued at all fronts (Eme and Anyadike, 2011:13). In fact, under his watch, the telecommunication sector was deregulated; he also fast track the privatization and sales of many 'moribund' public companies (NITEL, NiconNoga Hilton Hotel etc.); in the oil sector, he saw to the deregulation of the downstream sector (Igbuzor, 2003).

Disappointingly, the reform could not be said to have achieved meaningful result by the time the regime wound up on May 29th, 2007. Although, in terms of quantitative growth, the regime claimed, that the economy improved (Okonjo-Iweala and Osafo-Kwaako, 2007) but the realities on ground in terms of qualitative human indices proved otherwise (Aluko, 2007). The exit of Obasanjo from office did not put an end to globalization- oriented market reform as his successors continued, albeit with different strategies. However, irrespective of the strategies, the state continues to withdraw from its historic and constitutional missions of social provisioning. The point being made here is that, neoliberal globalization, as manifested in the market reforms of the post-military Nigeria, has had serious implication for state-citizen relations in Nigeria.

How? By virtue of its nature, the state is best positioned to push for development in any social formation but as an abstract construct, it does not itself effect such change (Skocpol, 1985; Basiru and Akinboye, 2013). To be specific, the change behaviour of the state comes from certain officials, who are insulated from dominant social and economic interests. In other words, the state and its officials must be autonomous of the dominant interests (Trimberger, 1978). Indeed, Chibber (2002) have enumerated the features of such a state. First, it must be staffed by rule following bureaucrats. Second, it must have an appropriately co-ordinated state apparatus and third, it must act as corporate entities with broadly collective goals.

In all indications, African states are not in this category as they have been hijacked by the powerful non- state actors, the military, political parties, drug barons, multinational companies, etc.

This explains why Ake (1985) refrains from referring to social formations in Africa as independent states. According to him, '*In Africa, there are few social formations that are capitalist enough or socialist enough to be identifiable as clearly boasting the state form of domination*' (Ake, 1985:108). Its non-hegemonic status probably makes it vulnerable to the non-state captors. In post- military Nigeria, the state appeared to have been captured by the new agents of globalization-the transnational elites, the Bretton woods bureaucrats, World Trade Organization (WTO) and the inner caucus of the ruling People Democratic Party (Onuoha, 2009). Having captured the state and its apparatus, the ruling party rather than nurturing the culture of participatory development reverted back to the old era development dictatorship. It soon became the architect of the neo-liberal agenda under the guise of globalization (Umezurike, 2012).

In fact, it was generally alleged that the privatization agenda was nothing but avenue for the party stalwarts and their backers in the private sector to further strengthened their material base (Igbuzor, 2003). Remarkably, democracy and development were defined in technocratic terms as public policy became the prerogatives of professionals. To be sure, there was the replacement of citizen democracy by consumer democracy, with citizens conceived as consumers, clients and users, government services increasingly seen as commodities and access based on the ability to pay. Boyte (2004:4) aptly captured the adverse implications for citizens. According to him:

When politics becomes the property of professional elites, bureaucrats and consultants, most people are marginalized in the serious work of public affairs. Citizens are reduced to, at most, secondary roles as demanding consumers or altruistic volunteers. Moreover, with the transformation of mediating institutions..., such as civil society think-tanks, [which] became technical service providers - citizens lost all stake and standing in the public world. Consequently, the question of democracy has largely neglected issues of economic justice - basic needs such as access to food, shelter, medical care and housing. In the absence of equal opportunity for all citizens to these essentials for human existence, the equality being stressed in liberal democracy is defeated.

The incapacitation of the state resulting from its capture by these agents of globalization has had serious implications for the country's development trajectory and by extension, citizenship. Adebajo (2008:2) puts the sorry state in perspective:

Over its nearly fifty years on independence Nigeria has been reduced to a giant collection of impoverished masses, a crumbling tower of Babel built on the rickety foundation of oil rents collected and squandered by its leaders. In

spite of its enormous oil wealth, Nigeria remains a largely poor country. Over 70% of its population still lives on less than \$1 dollar a day, life expectancy is at an abysmal 47 years and the country ranked 159 out of 177 states on the UN Human Development index in 2006.

In response to the crisis, the disarticulated people had to realign and find an ideology to rely on, whereupon fundamentalism and ethno-nationalism increased in salience (Osaghae, 1995; Jega, 2000). With the passage of time, these ideologies snowballed into militancy as manifested in the activities of militant groups in the Niger-Delta as well as the terrorism of the Boko-Haram group in Northern Nigeria. It is in this context that this article situates the insecurity in Northern part and elsewhere in the country.

Concluding Notes: Any Prospect for Resolution?

This article has unearthed the hidden drivers of the contemporary security impasse in the northern part and elsewhere in the country. Although, religious fundamentalism could not be ruled out in the whole equation; the paper, however contends that must be subsumed within the larger framework, the legitimacy crisis of the Nigerian state. Put differently, beyond the facade of insecurity wrought on the Nigerian nation by the fundamentalism of Boko-Haram, lays the hidden driver, globalization-induced state delegitimization.

The state as it is presently constituted in Nigeria is anti- democratic and development, and thus cannot promote general well beings of the people; it is a natural trigger of insecurity. Given this state of affairs, it is doubtful if the Hobbesian commodious community could be nurtured. What should be done? First, the civil society in Nigeria must wake up from their slumber and be alive to their historic mission of checking the authoritarian and anti-developmental tendency of the state. Only such independent bodies offer the hope of acting as a check on the obnoxious and harsh policies of the state and its failure to deliver the public good.

Second, the media must be part of the new agenda of creating a new template of governance and development in the country. They must constantly inform the citizen about what is going in the political arena. Third, there is the need for the politico-economic decentralization of Nigerian federal system so as to guarantee social justice and equity.

Finally and ultimately, the entire Nigerian structure needs to be deglobalized, delegitimized and reconstructed by the people. The Nigerian state as it is presently constituted is alien to the people; it needs be indigenized, made autochthonous and democratic. A state that is for all is better placed to promote inclusive citizenship, nationalism and development than a state for the few. Nigeria needs such a state at this epoch in her history. In real terms, the Lugardian ghost must be exorcised via an autochthonous process of constitution making and this could only be done with a national sovereign conference in which all Nigerians are brought together to decide their common future.

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